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CUSTODY-TO WHICH PARENT?
RALPH J. PODELL*
HARRY F. PECK**
AND
CURRY FIRST***
INTRODUCTION
Child custody cases are widely acknowledged by judges as
among the most painful and difficult tasks they face demanding
cognizance that the generalizations and absolutes of the past have
often led to a result contrary to the child's best interest.
A judge agonizes more about reaching the right result in a con-
tested custody issue than about any other type of decision he
renders.'
This (custody) law bears the stamp of many conflicting values
from the past, randomly and often illogically mixed with newer
views about the rights of children.2
Historically, custody awards have been dictated or controlled by
amorphous platitudes or generalizations on one hand and by
rigid absolutes on the other.3
At common law the father was generally entitled as a matter
of right to custody of his minor children,4 but later the law gener-
ally gave the mother preference. Today the law recognizes the
child's best interest as the determinative factor. The best interest
rule was formulated by two of our most eminent jurists, Justices
Cardozo and Brewer. Mr. Justice Brewer did much to shape the
doctrine in his opinion in Chapsky v. Wood,' rendered before his
appointment to the United States Supreme Court. He repudiated
the rule which affirmed the parent's primary right and applied the
* Member of the Wisconsin Bar, Chairman of the Family Law Section of the American
Bar Association. Circuit Court Judge, 2d Circuit, Milwaukee County.
* Member of the Wisconsin Bar.
*** Member of the Wisconsin Bar.
I. B. BOTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273 (1952).
2. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969).
3. Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 422 (1964).
4. 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 234 (2d ed. 1961). Jensen v. Jensen, 168
Wis. 502, 170 N.W. 735 (1919).
5. Larson v. Larson, 30 Wis. 2d 291, 140 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
6. 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
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best interest of the child test. In a precedent setting opinion, Judge
Cardozo reaffirmed Brewer's ruling.7
The best interest of the child doctrine cannot be applied within
its historical and present spirit and purpose unless the law places
both parents on equal footing.8
II. BEST INTEREST OF CHILD RULE DEMANDS EQUALITY BE-
TWEEN PARENTS
Fortunately for the children of divorced parents the law has
progressed from the illogical rhetoric which stated "There is but a
twilight zone between a mother's love and the atmosphere of
heaven," ' to the point where the parents are considered equals, the
child's interest is considered paramount, and the courts even ap-
point a guardian for the children."0 The assumption that, other
things being equal, maternal custody was best, has been justly
criticized as incongruous with the best interest of the child theory
and out of touch with contemporary thought."
What a mother's care means to her children has been so much
romanticized and poeticized that its reality and its substance
7. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not proceed upon the
theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action against
the other or indeed against anyone. He act as parens patriae to do what is best for
the interest of the child.
8. DESPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (1962); GOLDSTEIN AND KATZ, THE FAMILY AND
THE LAW, (1965); Coyne, Who Will Speak for the Children? 383 ANNALS 34 (1969); Foster
and Freed, Child Custody, supra note 3; Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in
Divorce Actions, 6 J. FAMILY LAW 1 (1966); Oster, Custody Proceedings: A Study of Vague
and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAMILY LAW 21 (1965); Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Chil-
dren of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 807 (1944); Watson, The Children
of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, supra note 2; Weinman, The
Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721 (1944); Comment,
Measuring the Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete Considerations, 44 DENVER
LAW J. 132 (1967); Note, Custody of Children in Minnesota: Factual Considerations, 38
MINN. L. REV.; Comment, Child Custody Considerations in Granting the Award Between
Adversely Claiming Parents, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1963).
9. Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. 1938). Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592,
595, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (1921):
For a boy of such tender years nothing. can be an adequate substitute for mother
love-for that constant ministration required during the period of nurture that only
a mother can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire; in her alone
is service expressed in terms of love. She alone has the patience and sympathy
required to mold and soothe the infant mind in its adjustment to its environment.
The difference between fatherhood and motherhood in this respect is fundamental
and the law should recognize it unless offset by undesirable traits in the matter.
10. Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 422, 436-7 (1964).
11. Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
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have sometimes been lost in the flowers of rhetoric. Not all
mothers can lay claim to such eulogy. 2
A. The Difficulties Involved with Mother As Head of Family
Unit Further Support ParentalEquality.
The assumption that the mother is a better custodian was and
is wrong from an historical, economic, sociological, and philosoph-
ical point of view. The notion is unfounded because it fails to
project the family unit into the post-divorce reality where the
mother must assume both a mother's and a father's role. A look
at the contemporary role of the mother and the difficulties encoun-
tered when she alone runs the family unit supports the current
egalitarian viewpoint.
A role analysis of the family members is a useful tool of sociolo-
gists in determining family relationships and attitudes. Mother-
hood is only one of the various sociological roles assumed by the
wife in our society. The behavioral scientist recognizes the other
emerging roles of companion and partner played by the modern
American wife.
. . . Assuming that the wife has fulfilled the court's notion of
motherhood on the basis of her conduct prior to the custody
award, the issue is raised whether she will in fact continue to
fulfill this role as a single parent. An examination of this question
rests on the concept of the organization of the family in our
culture...
The family in a custody matter is always a disunited family. Its
structure as an organized unit has been dissolved by the divorce
or separation decree . ...
* . .*. In the American conjugal family, however, divorce or
separation of the parents means dissolution of the unit . ...
Upon the dissolution of the nuclear family by divorce or separa-
tion, three responses of the remaining spouse may be manifested.
(I) Reconstruction of the Basic Unit With a New Member. The
parent can remarry with the anticipation that her new spouse will
legally adopt the children to restore the family to its original
state . . . (2) Reorganization of the Remaining Members by
Assignment of New Roles Within the Structure. The parent may
reassign obligations performed by the absent spouse to herself
and her children. . . . (3) Dissolution of the Family Unit. The
parent may terminate the nuclear family by taking the children
to live with grandparents.
12. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 435 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. 1968).
19721
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
When any of these three responses is manifested, any traditional
notion of motherhood seems to be undermined, due to the practi-
cal difficulties with which the divorce custodian is faced. As
Robert F. Drinan has stated (Drinan, The Rights of Children in
Modern American Family Life, 2 J. FAM. L. 101, 102 (1962) "It
seems fair to say that American law has not thought out a consis-
tent legal theory by which the once-married but emancipated,
and now divorced, woman can fulfill all her duties to . . . the
children over whom she has custody."
... . Mothers, in order to meet the practical necessities of their
situation as sole parent, had assumed roles opposed to the tradi-
tional notion of motherhood and more analogous to the father-
hood role. It is submitted that in cases where the mother must
assume the role offather, which the courts have found is usually
not in the best interest of the child, that she should not be entitled
to custody under the traditional "motherhood" test. In such
cases, the mother and father should be considered on an equal
role status and other factors should be given consideration in
determining custody. (Emphasis added) 3
B. Recent Statutes and Court Decisions Support The Egalitarian
View
Recent statutes and decisions support equal status of mother
and father vis-a-vis custody. Perhaps this trend is best exemplified
by the recent amendment to Wisconsin statutes which provides
that "in determining the parent with whom a child shall remain,
the court shall consider all facts in the best interest of the child and
shall not prefer one parent over the other solely on the basis of the
sex of the parent."' 4
The standards for court determination of custody, set forth in
the proposed Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, provide as fol-
lows:
(Best Interest of Child) The court shall determine custody in
accordance with the best interests of the child. The court shall
13. Comment, Measuring the Child's Best Interests-A Study of Incomplete
Considerations, 44 DENVER LAW J. 132, 138-42 (1967) (emphasis added).
Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAMILY
LAW 21, 26 (1965).
However, the urban family of today is a different unit, economically and sociologi-
cally, from its rural counterpart of one hundred years ago. It can no longer be stated
that woman's sole occupation is to care for babies.
See WINCH, THE MODERN FAMILY, 721 (Rev. ed. 1965); Davis, Sociological and Statistical
Analysis, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1944).
14. WIS. STAT. § 247.24(3) (1971), as created, Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 157.
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consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child's best interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community;
and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.15
As the comment following this section makes clear, it contains
no new law but merely codifies the existing law in most jurisdic-
tions relating to factors generally held relevant in determining what
the best interests of the child dictate. The section avoids restate-
ment of the familiar presumptions to which courts have frequently
alluded, pointing out that they are valid only when and to the
extent that they promote the best interest of the child. That recom-
mendation thus moves beyond the rhetoric to the rationale and
reinforces the argument as to the standards the court should apply
and the manner of this application.
Section 70 of the New York State Domestic Relations Law was
recently amended to reflect a similar outlook:
In all cases there shall be no primafacie right to the custody of
the child in either parent, but the court shall determine solely
which is for the best interest of the child, and what will best
promote its welfare and happiness ....
Florida's new Domestic Relations Law, which went into effect
on July 1, 1971, gives the father equal consideration in the award-
ing of child custody.
The court shall award custody and visitation rights of minor
children of the parties as a part of proceeding for dissolution of
marriage in accordance with the best interest of the child. Upon
considering all relevant factors, the father of the child shall be
given the same consideration as the mother in determining
custody. (Emphasis added) 7
15. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT. This act was drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at St. Louis, Missouri, August,
1970.
16. N.Y. DONIEsTIc LAW § 70 (McKinney 1964).
17. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (1971).
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No party shall be presumed to be able to serve the best interest
of the child better than the other party because of sex."8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has progressed in the same
direction. While fifteen years ago this court felt that the mother
was to be preferred,19 it has since moved along the path suggested
by Justice Thomas Fairchild in his dissent to Eisler, where he
quoted Hamachek v. Hamachek:
The importance of the natural love and affection of the mother
may be outweighed by other elements .... 10
The influence capable of inspiring wholesome ideals and pur-
poses in a growing child is not completely encompassed in the
relationship of mother and child ....
Typical of this trend is Kritzik v. Kritzik.1 There the court
criticized the concept that the trial judge was merely an arbiter
between two private parties, balancing their rights and interests,
and emphasized the function of the courts "to determine what
provisions and terms would best guarantee an opportunity for the
children involved to grow to mature and responsible citizens re-
gardless of the desires of the respective parties."
A year later in Greenlee v. Greenlee,22 the court approved a
transfer of custody from the mother to the father without any
finding of unfitness, adhering to the rule that the best interests of
the children were the controlling criteria, and pointing out that
there was no rule of law that the mother was entitled to any
preference.
Perhaps the best indication that courts are not merely paying
lip service to the "best interest of child rule" but giving it substance
and following its spirit is an analysis of the numerous recent cases
in which the parents were treated equally and the father pre-
vailed.?
18. COLO. REV. STATS. § 46-1-5(7) (1963), PERM. Supp. (1969). See generally: Turner
v. Turner, 46 Ala. 350, 242 So.2d 397 (1970); Barton v. Barton, 230 Cal. App. 2d 43, 40
Cal. Rptr. 676 (1964); Smith v. Smith, 474 P.2d 619 (Colo. 1970); Reiland v. Reiland, 290
Minn. 497, 499, 185 N.W.2d 879, 880 (1971):
The father and mother are the natural guardians of the minor children and, if not
unsuitable, are, depending upon the circumstances, equally entitled to their custody
19. State ex rel. Hannon v. Eisler, 270 Wis. 469, 71 N.W.2d 376 (1955).
20. Hamachek v. Hamachek, 270 Wis. 194, 201, 70 N.W.2d 595, 599 (1959).
21. Kritzik v. Kritzik, 21 Wis.2d 442, 124 N.W.2d 581 (1963).
22. Greenlee v. Greenlee, 23 Wis. 2d 669, 127 N.W.2d 737 (1964).
23. Ayers v. Kelley, 284 Ala. 321, 224 So. 2d 673 (1969). Northcutt v. Northcutt, 45
Ala. App. 646, 235 So. 2d 896 (1970); Harding v. Harding, 377 P.2d 378 (Alaska 1962);
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III. AGE, INTELLIGENCE AND MATURITY OF CHILDREN DEMAND
THEIR PREFERENCE BE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT: ARCHAIC
"TENDER YEARS" DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE.
The consideration given a child's preference in awarding cus-
tody depends upon several factors: (i) the age and maturity of the
child; (ii) the strength of the preference; and (iii) whether or not
all of the children in the family express the same preference.
A recent annotation summarizes the law regarding a child's
preference:
It seems to be generally recognized by the courts that the initial
factor to be examined by the court in determining what weight,
if any, to give to the custodial preference of the child involved is
the child's capacity to make an informed and intelligent judg-
ment. The courts have frequently taken the position, in the ab-
sence of specific statute, that the law does not set a specific age
at which it will be presumed that the child has such capacity, but
rather, the capacity of each child will be evaluated individually
on the basis of the child's mental development, maturity, and the
extent to which the child exhibits intellectual discretion.
Quails v. Quails, 250 Ark. 328, 465 S.W.2d 110 (1971); Shaw v. Shaw, 249 Ark. 835, 462
S.W.2d 222; Hobby v. Hobby, 214 Cal. App. 2d 246, 29 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1963); Wood v.
Wood, 207 Cal. App. 2d 24 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1962); Harrison v. Harrison, 170 Colo. 397,
462 P.2d 119 (1969); Dixon v. Dixon, 190 A.2d 652 (D.C. 1963); Longstreth v. Longstreth,
171 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1965); Pacheco v. Pacheo, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1970); Parks v. Parks,
91 Ida. 420, 422 P.2d 618 (1967); Froman v. Froman, 73 I11. App. 2d 421,218 N.E.2d 808
(1966); Maroney v. Maroney, 109 Ill. App. 2d 162, 249 N.E.2d 871 (1969); Heater v.
Heater, 254 Iowa 586, 118 N.W.2d 587 (1962); Jones v. Jones, 175 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa
1970); McNamara v. McNamara, 181 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1970); Gardner v. Gardner, 192
Kan. 529, 389 P.2d 746 (1964); Merriweather v. Merriweather, 190 Kan. 598, 376 P.2d 921
(1962); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 458 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1970); Morris v. Morris, 152 So. 2d
291 (La. 1963); Glick v. Glick, 232 Md. 244, 192 A.2d 791 (1963); Bushre v. Smedley, 18
Mich. App. 347, 171 N.W.2d 50 (1969); Damaschke v. Damaschke, 21 Mich. App. 80, 174
N.W.2d 608 (1969); Dimmick v. Dimmick, 22 Mich. App. 84, 176 N.W.2d 728 (1970); Fish
v. Fish, 21 Mich. App. 183, 175 N.W.2d 343 (1970); Lamky v. Lamky, 29 Mich. App. 17,
185 N.W.2d 203 (1970); Tarr v. Pollock, 25 Mich. App. 437, 181 N.W.2d 664 (1970);
Lobash v. Lobash, 283 Minn. 255, 167 N.W.2d 43 (1969); Shoffner v. Shoffner, 244 Miss.
557, 145 So. 2d 149 (1962); J. v. R., 446 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. 1969); Kelch v. Kelch, 462
S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1970); Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1969); Copple v. Copple,
186 Neb. 696, 185 N.W.2d 846 (1971); Costello v. Costello, 185 Neb. 396, 176 N.W.2d 10
(1970); Lemay v. Lemay, 109 N.H. 217,247 A.2d 189 (1968); Ettinger v. Ettinger, 72 N.M.
300, 383 P.2d 261; In re Anonymous, 238 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1962); T. v. V., 318 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1971); Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969); Thomas v. Thomas,
259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963); Brown v. Brown - Or. _ , 481 P.2d 643 (1971);
Cathcart v. Cathcart, 232 Or. 624, 376 P.2d 665 (196wz; Jebousek v. Jebousek, 252 Or. 628,
451 P.2d 865 (1969); Kightlinger v. Kightlinger, 249 Or. 521, 439 P.2d 614 (1968);
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 253 Or. 447, 454 P.2d 857 (1969); Daniels v. Daniels, 414
S.W.2d 207 (Tex. 1967); Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461 (1971).
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The importance of the preliminary inquiry into the child's age,
maturity, and intelligence is readily seen from the fact that a
number of courts have held that findings that the child has
reached the age of intellectual discretion justified giving control-
ling effect or great weight to the child's custodial preference.
24
In Seelandt v. Seelandt,25 the Wisconsin Supreme Court dis-
cussed the weight a trial court should give to the preference of a
child. The court observed that the daughter was only three weeks
short of her fifteenth birthday at thetime of the hearing, and cited
Jones v. State ex rel. Falligant,6 which approved the practice of
giving serious consideration to the wishes of minor children. The
court held that, as in Edwards v. Edwards,2 7 the personal prefer-
ence of the child is very important, and although not controlling
on the issue of custody, should be followed if the child "gives
substantial reasons why it would be against his or her best interest
to award custody contrary to such expressed preference."
The decision suggests two possible procedures in discussing the
issue of custody with the child. One is to have a reporter in cham-
bers during a conference with the judge to record what transpires.
He would not transcribe his notes or file a transcript, unless an
appeal was taken. The second procedure would be to have the trial
judge dictate the gist of the child's comments into the record. This
case thus outlines with some specificity the steps that should be
taken to consider a child's preference, and indicates what questions
children should be asked by the judge to make the record clear.
In Graichen v. Graichen,2 8 the court approved asking the pref-
erence of the minor daughter who lacked only one day of attaining
her fourteenth birthday. The court cited Jones v. State ex rel.
Falligant,"9 to the effect that the primary consideration is the
child's welfare, and parents have no right to the child as if he or
she were a chattel, but rather only a privilege to raise the child and
prepare if for life. Since the time at which the child will take charge
of his or her own life is not too far distant, it is appropriate to
24. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 66 (1964). See 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 259-
63 (2d ed. 1961).
25. 24 Wis. 2d 73, 128 N.W.2d 66 (1964).
26. 211 Wis. 9, 247 N.W. 445 (1933).
27. 270 Wis. 48, 70 N.W.2d 22 (1955).
28. 20 Wis. 2d 200, 121 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
29. 211 Wis. 9, 247 N.W. 445 (1933). The court also cited In re Goodenough, 19 Wis.
274 (1865), Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P.2d 16 (1958) and Vilas v. Vilas, 184
Ark. 352, 42 S.W.2d 379 (1931) to the effect that the preferences of a child should be
considered.
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consider the child's wishes and desires. Statutes provide that a
minor over fourteen years of age may nominate his own guardian,
who shall be appointed-if the court approves. Ordinarily, courts
give much consideration, in cases where guardians are to be ap-
pointed, to the wishes of the child.
The child's preference rule is, of course, but one facet of the
child's best interest test. Nevertheless, in most cases it will be in
the child's best interest to be with the parent preferred.
Writers have sharply criticized courts for paying mere lip serv-
ice to the child's wishes regarding custody.
At least where the pertinent factors are evenly balanced, the
child's wishes should be decisive unless the person chosen by the
child is obviously unfit or the child's choice is the result of
coercion or bribery. (emphasis added)"
In Edwards v. Edwards,31 custody was transferred from a fos-
ter home to the father despite the adverse history of the father's
performance. The court felt that there was ample evidence he had
reformed over the preceding five years. Although this may not
always be sufficient, it was in this case. The court stressed the
importance of an eleven-year-old boy having his father's affection
and guidance through his teenage years. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the mother was neither fit to have nor interested in
custody.
In a dramatic display of the importance of a child's preference,
the decision was reversed on rehearing, solely because the foster
parents submitted a brief stating that the child was "sick at heart"
because custody had been returned to his father. Although this did
not appear in the record, and two of the justices dissented for that
reason, the court vacated its order and directed that the trial court
take the testimony of the young child. At the time of the decision
on rehearing the boy had just reached his twelfth birthday. Al-
though he was under fourteen years of age, the court held it was
imperative to have his testimony. The court said that if he testified
that he preferred to remain in the foster home, it should be deemed
controlling on the issue of custody if "the testimony of the boy goes
beyond this matter of personal preference, and gives substantial
reasons why it would be against his best interests to be compelled
to reside with his father."
30. Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 442, 443 (1964).
31. 270 Wis. 48, 70 N.W.2d 22, 71 N.W.2d 366 (reversed on rehearing) (1955).
19721
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The preference of the child has been considered an important
factor in many jurisdictions other than Wisconsin. In J. v.E., 31 the
preference of a fifteen-year-old boy for his father was deemed
persuasive considering his antipathy toward his mother, his mental
maturity, and judgmental ability. In Hurly v. Hurly,3 the father
was granted custody of his thirteen- and eleven-year-old daughters
as the court found they were of sufficient age to form intelligent
opinions and disliked their mother. In Aske v. Aske, 34 the court
considered the preference of a nine-year-old girl to remain with her
father holding that intelligence and maturity were determined not
by an arbitrary age standard but by actual mental development.35
Some courts have characterized the child's preference as a
"major factor,"36 given it "serious consideration," 37 or held it to
be an "important factor. ' 38 In the celebrated DuPont case39 the
preference of a sixteen-year-old girl to go with her father was held
to be decisive."
A child's preference for one parent may reflect his best interests
and compulsion to live with the other parent may be severely detri-
mental. In Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. McDonald,4 the
court complied with the preference of a twelve-year-old boy for his
32. 417 S.W.2d 199 (Mo. 1967).
33. 147 Mont. 118, 411 P.2d 359 (1966).
34. 233 Minn. 540, 47 N.W.2d 417 (1951).
35. Other cases in which the courts have given "a real weight" to the child's preference
include: Davis v. Davis, 255 Ala. 592, 52 So. 2d 387 (1951); Gardiner v. Willis, 258 Ala.
647, 64 So. 2d 609 (1953); Eddy v. Staufer, 37 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1948); Roberts v. Roberts,
194 S.W.2d 1003 (Ky. 1946); and Sanders v. Felzman, 213 S.W.2d 428 (Ky. 1948).
Two 1971 cases gave "considerable weight" to the preference of the child: Okun v.
Okun, 66 Misc. 2d 241, 320 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1971); and In re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C.
App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).
36. In re Custody of Smesler, 22 Ohio Misc. 41, 257 N.E.2d 769 (1969).
37. Marcus v. Marcus, 109 I11. App. 2d 423, 248 N.E.2d 800 (1969).
38. In re Neff, 394 Pa. 162, 145 A.2d 857 (1958).
39. DuPont v. DuPont, 216 A.2d 674 (Del. 1966).
40. Hammett v. Hammett, 46 Ala. App. 206, 239 So. 2d 778 (1970) (father granted
custody of three children who preferred him; girls eleven and fourteen years old, boy twelve
years old); Barton v. Barton, 230 Cal. App. 2d 43, 40 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1964) (sixteen-year-
old girl to father); Guldman v. Heller, 151 N.W.2d 436 (N.D. 1967) (preference of nine-
year-old boy for father); Rayner v. Rayner, 253 Or. 447, 454 P.2d 856 (1969) (Supreme
Court modified trial court decision so as to change the custody of all five children from
mother to father); Commonwealth ex rel. Traeger v. Ritting, 206 Pa. Super. 446, 213 A.2d
681 (1965) (father granted custody of five children who expressed a preference for him); In
re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 596 (1968) (unequivocal preference of intelligent
eleven-year-old girl); Smith v. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386 P.2d 900 (1963) (custody of six-
year-old child to father).
41. 183 Pa. Super. 411, 132 A.2d 710 (1957).
[Vol. 56
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paternal aunt rather than his father or step-mother. Carefully con-
sidering his preference, the court held that when a child of his age
was emphatic the court must seriously consider the emotional ef-
fect of the course he feared.
Courts have also felt that few desires are as strong or fears as
great as those of youth, and a twelve-year-old boy's lack of control
over his own destiny could be frustrating to the degree that he
could become emotionally disturbed and permanently harmed.
2
IV. EMOTIONAL INSTABILITY OF ONE PARENT IMPORTANT FAC-
TOR IN AWARDING CUSTODY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted the view that a
finding of "an emotional disturbance of a parent which makes it
harmful to the welfare of a minor child to continue custody in such
parent is tantamount to a finding of unfitness."43 This is the con-
trolling factor when a parent involved in a custody fight is emotion-
ally disturbed or unstable. The court uses the terms synonymously,
and holds that they establish unfitness as a matter of law. This
determines the custody question since a parent who is unfit cannot
have custody of a child.
It is interesting that both Belisle and Seelandt result from at-
tempts of a mother to gain custody of a minor child from paternal
grandparents. According to the Wisconsin court, Seelandt is the
first holding in this state that emotional disturbance requires a
finding of unfitness, within the Wisconsin statutes. The court in
Seelandt conceded that the mother was a woman of good morals,
and that usually was enough to be "fit and proper" in the past. The
court pointed out, however, that Hellermann v. Hellermann,44
preshadowed change, for it expressed concern with whether a di-
vorced mother:
possessed the mental and emotional stability to permit custody
42. See Varney v. Trout, 232 Ky. 513, 23 S.WV.2d 944 (1930); Anderson v. Anderson,
110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 (1946).
See also Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 422, 433 (1964):
Where the child's attachment to one parent is intense, severe damage may result
from awarding custody or excessive visitation rights to the other. Whenever a child
indicates a strong preference, the court should throughly study not only what is best
for the child's psychological welfare but also what effect custody and visitation rights
will have on his emotional and mental health.
43. Belisle v. Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d 317, 134 N.W.2d 491 (1965); Seelandt v. Seelandt, 24
Wis. 2d 73, 128 N.W.2d 66 (1964).
44. 249 Wis. 190, 23 N.W.2d 408 (1946).
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of two minor children to be awarded her. Implicit in the decision
in that case was the assumption that if she lacked such mental
or emotional stability, she would not be a fit person to be
awarded custody within the provisions of Sec. 247.24, Wis. Stats.
Nearly one year later to the day Belisle was decided, in which
the Wisconsin court held that the trial court's finding that the
mother was "still emotionally unstable" was equivalent to a find-
ing of unfitness, even though the trial court did not expressly find
unfitness. Although the trial court used the terminology "emotion-
ally unstable," the Wisconsin Supreme Court used the words
"emotional disturbance" and "emotional instability," as well as
"emotionally unstable." The court refused to permit the mother to
have custody despite a decision of another trial court holding the
same mother fit to have custody of a daughter born of a different
previous marriage.
In Seelandt, the court also observed that the "plaintiff's neu-
rosis had a harmful effect on" the child. Apparently the term
"neurosis" is also synonymous with "emotional disturbance."
Other courts have held the same way. In Illinois, the courts
denied custody to the mother of boys, two and six years old, and
a five-year-old girl upon a finding that the mother exhibited unsta-
ble behavior." In Kayser v. Kayser,4 custody was awarded to the
father upon a finding that the wife was incapable of giving the
children a proper home because of her personal weaknesses, not-
withstanding her love, sincerity of purpose and feeling for her chil-
dren. In Bull v. Bull,47 custody was awarded to the father solely
because the mother lacked emotional stability. In another case, a
mother, who needed psychiatric care, was denied custody of her
nine-year-old daughter.4 1
A mother was denied custody in Modling v. Modling,49 because
she was away from home many nights, highly nervous and at times
emotionally unstable. Based on a finding that the mother was emo-
tionally disturbed and the children all preferred the father, the
45. Loveless v. Loveless, 128 I11. App. 2d 297, 261 N.E.2d 732. See also Corcoran v.
Corcoran, 79 II1. App. 2d 328, 224 N.E.2d 611 (1967) (father awarded custody of boys,
fifteen and seventeen years old, and girls, nine and thirteen years old, where mother had
history of mental illness and failed to get medical evidence of recovery, and there was no
question of father's ability to care for the children).
46. 164 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1969).
47. 206 Cal. App. 2d 642, 24 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1962).
48. Knox v. Knox, 226 Ga. 619, 176 S.E.2d 712 (1970).
49. 45 Ala. App. 493, 232 So. 2d 673 (1970).
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Illinois court, in Barbara v. Barbara,0 awarded him custody of his
thirteen- and fourteen-year-old daughters and eight- and ten-year-
old sons. In Hyde v. Hyde, 51 the father was awarded custody of his
two-year-old daughter on a finding that the mother's emotional
state was such that she could not give care and security to the child.
Because of a personality disorder, the mother was denied custody
of her three daughters in Hohensee v. Hohensee.52 In another case,
when psychiatrists testified that the mother was a "disturbed indi-
vidual" and the children should not be placed with her, she was
denied custody. 53
V. OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS IN CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
A. Valid Considerations
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has looked to a broad spectrum
of factors in analyzing parental behavior to determine which par-
ent should have custody in the best interests of minor children.
Some of the major factors have been previously discussed, but
there are others, less important individually, which nevertheless
merit amplification.
In Obenberger v. Obenberger,54 the court denied the mother
custody of a boy in his early teens because of her excess drinking
and harboring a married man in her home under such circumstan-
ces as to indicate that her adulterous relationship with the man was
known to her son.
50. 110 III. App. 2d 189, 249 N.E.2d 269 (1969).
51. 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 (1969).
52. 183 Neb. 388, 154 N.W.2d 878 (1967).
53. Morrissey v. Morrissey, 182 Neb. 268, 154 N.W.2d 66 (1967). See also: Borden v.
Borden, 193 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1966) (mother had personality problem); Cleverly v. Stone, 141
Mont. 204, 378 P.2d 653 (1962) (mother unstable); Swanson v. Swanson, 137 Neb. 699,
290 N.W. 908 (1940) (mother had highly nervous temperment and was given to instability
of a nature not conducive to a proper home life for children); Kroll v. Kroll, 241 Or. 576,
407 P.2d 643 (1965) (mother emotionally unstable); Brown v. Brown, 206 Pa. Super. 439,
213 A.2d 395 (1965) (mother's character unstable); Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Bell, 200
Pa. Super. 646, 189 A.2d 908 (1963) (mother emotionally unstable); Long v. Long, 247 So.
Car. 250, 146 S.E. 873 (1966) (mother unstable).
Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 422, 441-2 (1964):
A questionnaire used by Wisconsin adoption agencies, for example, could perhaps
assist courts in custody cases more than the rather vague standards now in use. The
questionnaire attempts to ascertain relevant factual material and to discover the
physical, social and material circumstances of those seeking to take charge of a
child's life. The following questions are posed . . . . b. Mental Health, Whether
there has been . . . . (2) a past history of outpatient psychiatric treatment . . ..
54. 200 Wis. 318, 228 N.W. 492 (1930).
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In Cudahy v. Cudahy,"0 custody of an eight-year-old boy was
granted to his father. The court alluded to the favorable influence
of the father and his qualifications to direct the child's growth and
development. The court noted that although the mother was of
good moral character and able to give the boy love, attention and
affection, her insistence upon regulating minor details of his life
was not beneficial to development of mature and responsible initia-
tive and tended to make him nervous. The court considered expert
evidence that an eight-year-old boy has more need of his father
than his mother.
In Lewis v. Lewis, 6 the court approved a finding that the wife
was unfit because an illicit relationship, which started while her
husband was in the Armed Forces and continued after his return,
showed so great a disregard of proprieties as to warrant awarding
custody to the husband. The wife's unwillingness to give up her
improper association and consider conventionalities required
awarding custody to the husband.
Although not controlling, in State ex rel. Hannon v. Eisler,7
and Acheson v. Acheson,58 the court held that the financial circum-
stances of the parent requesting custody could be considered. In the
latter case, the court also felt that the compansionship of other
children was a desirable factor.
In Wall v. Wall,59 the court held the mother was unfit because
she frequently kept late hours without explanation, was guilty of
immodest and improper actions while in the company of men, and
neglected and left the child without adequate supervision.
Hill v. Hill,"0 apparently turned on the facts that the father was
financially and otherwise unable to give the child the advantages
he could receive in his mother's home, and maternal custody would
result in the family remaining together. Sommers v. Sommers,"'
clarifies the rule in Hill by pointing out that it is not the law in
Wisconsin that an impoverished parent cannot have custody be-
cause financially unable to support the child. The court in
Sommers held that such an interpretation would not be "in accord-
ance with an enlightened concept of the law."
55. 217 Wis. 355, 258 N.W. 168 (1935).
56. 252 Wis. 576, 32 N.W.2d 227 (1948).
57. 270 Wis. 469, 71 N.W.2d 376 (1955).
58. 235 Wis. 610, 294 N.W. 6 (1940).
59. 252 Wis. 339, 31 N.W.2d 527 (1948).
60. 257 Wis. 388, 43 N.W.2d 455 (1950).
61. 33 Wis. 2d 22, 146 N.W.2d 428 (1966).
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Vishnevsky v. Vishnevsky, 2 is a somewhat sophisticated case
in which the custody decision hinged on psychiatric testimony that
the mother would dominate and interfere with the maturation of
her four-and seven-year-old sons, thereby distorting their interpre-
tations of sex, particularly in adolescence and adulthood; that she
had a great need to dominate all situations; and that she tended to
blame her environment and others for her own difficulties. It is
noteworthy, however, that the wife presented no psychiatric testi-
mony on her own behalf.
In Peterson v. Peterson,3 the court listed enlightenment, lov-
ingness, understanding, good judgment, and a sufficiently compre-
hensive plan for the child's future as important factors.
In Bohn v. Bohn, 4 custody of three young boys, aged nine,
seven and five was determined on the basis that ordinarily it is in
the best interests of children that they be kept together, and, in
general, maternal custody is considered best for young children.
The respective and relative financial situations of the parties were
also weighed by the court.
In Wendland v. Wendland,65 the court looked to neglect or
mistreatment of the children, difficulty or failure to work up to
capacity in school, attendance at the same church as prior to di-
vorce proceedings, the recommendation of the Department of
Family Conciliation, grooming, manners, health and nutrition.
Among the factors considered in Dodge v. Dodge,"6 was the
mother's propensity to use improper language and to yield to a
quick temper so as to inflict excessive and harmful discipline on
her daughter.
Subrt v. Subrt67 is a more obvious case involving the custody
of minor boys, approximately eight and ten years old. Custody was
awarded to the maternal grandmother, when the mother failed to
contest the order depriving her of custody, and the father was so
unfit that the children were afraid of him and so parsimonious as
to deprive them of proper food and clothing.
Brown v. Brown" turned on the wife's inability to provide par-
ental supervision. The court found that she frequently absented
62. 11 Wis. 2d 259, 105 N.W.2d 314 (1960).
63. 13 Wis. 2d 26, 108 N.W.2d 126 (1960).
64. 16 Wis. 2d 258, 114 N.W.2d 423 (1962).
65. 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
66. 268 Wis. 441, 67 N.W.2d 878 (1955).
67. 275 Wis. 628, 83 N.W.2d 122 (1957).
68. 9 Wis. 2d 322, 101 N.W.2d 48 (1960).
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herself from the home, leaving her ten- and twelve-year-old sons
alone without providing for care or supervision. Custody was
granted to the remarried father who could provide full-time care.
In Larson v. Larson,69 in granting custody to the father, the
court considered the mother's association with other men under
circumstances that implied or suggested moral laxity, irregular
hours, failure to keep the children as clean as appropriate, failure
to feed the children at regular hours, and frequent appearances at
local taverns, holding that both her moral conduct and the physical
care which she gave the children were insufficient.
B. Invalid Considerations.
On the other hand, there are various types of conduct which
courts have specifically rejected as support for a finding that a
parent was not entitled to custody. Perhaps the most important of
these is a distinction which might have been expected to fall prey
to prejudice but has not. The courts have repeatedly held that the
personal life of a parent, whether illegal or immoral, provided it
does not adversely affect the ability to be a parent and raise chil-
dren, is not determinative in custody questions, for a person may
be a bad spouse or citizen without necessarily being a bad parent.
As early as 1919, in Jensen v. Jensen, ° the Wisconsin court held
that an illegal attempted remarriage, including cohabitation, did
not necessarily "demonstrate depravity of heart or moral unfitness
to bring up a child."
In Elies v. Elies,71 the court discouhted the fact that the wife
remarried within one year in a different state on the advice of an
attorney, holding this was insufficient to overcome the evidence
showing that she was a good mother.
In Vogel v. Vogel,72 the court held that because the evidence
established the wife's adulterous conduct, she was morally unfit
(she became pregnant on two occasions by another man). The
court ruled that when the wife is morally unfit and there is no
testimony that the father is incompetent, unfit or unworthy, cus-
tody must be awarded to him if he can provide a suitable home
with proper supervision in his absence. The trial court's decision
69. 30 Wis. 2d 291, 140 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
70. 168 Wis. 502, 170 N.W. 735 (1919).
71. 239 Wis. 60, 300 N.W. 493 (1941).
72. 259 Wis. 373, 48 N.W.2d 501 (1951).
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to the contrary was reversed and the cause remanded for a new
trial.
In Bliffert v. Bliffert,73 the court approved the trial court's
determination that the mother was unfit because she engaged in
sexual relations with another man after the divorce, holding this
supported a finding of unfitness despite her repentance and reform,
because the trial court was entitled to evaluate the likelihood of
such reform and the seriousness of such repentance. Custody was
transferred to the father although he had remarried within the one-
year waiting period because that did not bear on fitness to raise a
child.
The principle that immorality does not determine fitness, in the
absence of an adverse effect on the parent's ability to raise the child
or on the children themselves, was reaffirmed in Wendland v.
Wendland.74 There the court distinguished Hamachek v.
Hamachek, 5 and Lewis v. Lewis, 76 on the grounds that any infer-
ence drawn from immorality in those cases was not a holding that
the immorality rendered the person unsuitable for custody, but
rather that the person had been found to be an unfit parent, and
therefore could not have custody, stressing that in the absence of
a finding of unfitness, there must be a specifically demonstrable
effect of the immoral conduct on the welfare of the children before
it can be controlling.
Similarly in Molloy v. Molloy,77 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
declined to hold that adultery as a matter of law rendered a mother
unfit for custody of her children, but agreed that it was a factor to
be considered. The court cited Larson v. Larson,7 and held that
an inference against the parties' interests could be drawn on the
issue of adultery from a refusal to testify on the grounds of possible
self-incrimination.
In Welker v. Welker," the court held as a matter of law that a
party could not be denied custody on the grounds of her doubts
about the existence of God and classification of her religious beliefs
as agnostic.
73. 14 Wis. 2d 316, 111 N.W.2d 188 (1961).
74. 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965).
75. 270 Wis. 194, 70 N.W.2d 595 (1955).
76. 252 Wis. 576, 32 N.W.2d 227 (1948).
77. 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292 (1970).
78. 30 Wis. 2d 291, 140 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
79. 24 Wis. 2d 570, 129 N.W.2d 134 (1964).
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In Koslowsky v. Koslowsky," the court held that a stipulation
of parties was not determinative in custody matters, and that the
requirement that the court decide on the basis of the best interest
of the child transcended any agreement of the parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems clear that the trend particularly among
the more enlightened courts is to ignore the rigid absolutes and
legalisms of the past and adhere with increasing frequency to the
trend toward reliance on the social scientists and expert testimony
of psychologists, psychiatrists, social investigators and other ex-
perts in the fields of human behavior.
On the other hand, there is the growing conviction that persons
with specialized training and experience, such as social workers,
are better qualified to determine what is in the best interests of
the child than even the best-intended judge .... "I
Such a study (of past court decisions) reveals that, in reaching
conclusions as to the best interests of a child and as to parental
fitness, courts consider criteria which, although useful, are inade-
quate in that they fail to force courts to consider essential factual,
social, medical and psychological information. Consequently, a
judge may have nothing but his common sense to guide him to a
wise solution of a complex problem .... 11
If ever the law should keep its eye on the dynamic quality of the
facts involved when juggling legal concepts, this is such a case
. . . In a word, it is not a field for fixed legal concepts adapted
to isolated instances like a single contract or a single tort. It is a
relationship that has within its almost all the complexity of life
itself. If ever there was a case in which the court should weigh
carefully all the individual interests and all the social interests
involved, this would seem to be that case. . ..
80. 41 Wis'. 2d 275, 163 N.W.2d 632 (1969).
81. Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 629, 632 (1954).
82. Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 422, 438 (1964).
83. Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 672. 684 (1942).
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